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With the arrival of accrual accounting and a performance budgeting system known as 
"accrual output budgeting", there have been huge changes in the mechanism of central 
financial control in the budget-dependent Australian public sector. This article 
outlines and evaluates these changes.  The new parliamentary appropriations 
arrangements are discussed, as is the increased role played by non-appropriated 
departmental "own-source" funding.  The commercialisation rationale of these 
changes is outlined.  Consideration is given to their implications for fiscal 





Public sector budgeting in Australia has changed radically in recent years.  Prior to 
the late 1990s, the Commonwealth (national) Government and all but one of the eight 
State/territory governments employed traditional "cash" accounting as the basis for 
financial reporting in their budget ("general government") sectors.  All governments 
presented their annual budgets to Parliament on a cash basis.  In the late 1990s, 
however, there was a general shift to accrual accounting for financial reporting 
purposes.  Virtually simultaneously, the Commonwealth and six of the eight 
State/territory governments adopted a performance budgeting system known as 




2 is a specific form of performance budgeting.  Exponents of 
performance budgeting argue that the annual government budget should be concerned 
with much more than financial control with much more, in other words, than the 
enforcement of central (ie treasury/cabinet/presidential) control over the aggregate 
level of present and future departmental expenditure.  They argue that budgeting 
should also serve as a key instrument for maximising efficiency and effectiveness in 
the government delivery of services to the community.  Budgeting ought, in other 
words, to be concerned not merely with the resources which departments use, but with 
the results which they produce with those resources. 
 
                                                 
*   The author would like to thank the many senior public servants throughout Australia who have been 
willing to assist his research project on accrual output budgeting in Australia through both formal 
interviews and informal discussions.   2
Accrual output budgeting draws heavily upon the conceptual framework of program 
budgeting, but goes much further than the program budgeting emphasis upon budget 
formulation in terms of outputs and the accountability role of performance indicators.  
Its distinctive feature is that it seeks to place the entire budget mechanism on an 
"internal market" or "purchaser/provider" footing.  AOB conceptualises the budget 
process as one in which the government "purchases" products from departments in 
market-type transactions.  Its aim is that departments should operate as quasi-
independent businesses.  Government funding is considered to be business "revenue", 
and departments have acquired their own individual profit and loss statements.  The 
idea is that departmental profit results should become a key departmental performance 
indicator. 
 
Australia imported AOB from New Zealand, which could in turn be said to have 
modelled its budget system on the sectoral internal markets developed in the Thatcher 
era in Britain (and more specifically, upon the internal market model implemented in 
the British National Health System)
3. 
 
As a consequence of the adoption of AOB, the Australian budget framework has been 
radically recast in the image of the market.   This has had major implications for the 
manner in which the financial control function of budgeting is effected, and it is upon 
these implications that this paper focuses. 
 
FINANCIAL CONTROL UNDER CASH ACCOUNTING AND BUDGETING 
 
Prior to the recent accounting and budgeting changes in Australia, financial control 
was largely appropriations-based.  The great bulk of funding available to departments 
was provided or authorised by Parliament either through annual budget appropriations 
or through special/standing appropriations
4.  During the 1970s and 1980s budget 
reformers had successfully striven to bring within the appropriations umbrella 
departmental funding sources (such as trust funds) which had previously been beyond 
the reach of parliamentary control and approval.  This was viewed at the time as a 
major victory for public accountability and democratic control. 
 
The "cash" budget appropriations framework which operated in Australia prior to the 
late 1990s was, in its essentials, similar to that which operated in many other parts of 
the world.  To simplify, each department received an appropriation for current 
outlays, and an appropriation for capital outlays.  Departments were not permitted to 
use current appropriations for capital purposes, or vice versa. 
 
As in many other parts of the world, most Australian governments modified the cash 
accounting framework for budgeting purposes so that departments were required to 
cover bills payable, as well as cash outlays, from their parliamentary outlays 
appropriations.  The incorporation of this accrual element within the cash budgeting 
framework was designed to deal with the problem that to set budgetary authorisation 
limits in terms of cash outlays is to leave departments with scope to evade those limits 
by manipulating expenses which involve future cash outlays.  Including bills payable 
in the budgetary definition of outlays still left financial commitment such as increases 
in accrued employee entitlements and financial/operating leases outside the scope of 
the appropriations mechanism.  Such commitments had to be controlled by other 
means, including some use of discretionary Treasury
5 controls (e.g. a requirement for   3
Treasury approval of leases).  It could therefore not be said that financial control 
relied exclusively on the appropriations mechanism.  Overall, however, reliance upon 
such administrative controls for financial control purposes was relatively limited. 
 
FINANCIAL CONTROL UNDER ACCRUAL OUTPUT BUDGETING 
 
Under the new system of accrual output budgeting, financial control mechanisms have 
changed significantly.  Departments no longer receive outlays appropriations.   
Simplifying a little, the two former outlays appropriations categories (current and 
capital) can be said to have been replaced by three new appropriations categories: a 
"payment for outputs" appropriation, an "equity injection" appropriation, and an 
appropriation for "administered" expenditures.  The payment for outputs 
appropriation supposedly represents the "price" paid to the department by the 
Government, acting in its purchaser role, for the services which the department 
delivers.  The equity injection is considered to be analogous to an injection of 
shareholder funds into a business
6.  The appropriation for administered items is 
intended to cover expenditures for purposes over which the department has no 
managerial control or accountability
7.  The need for this latter appropriations element 
arises from the AOB objective of creating unambiguous departmental accountability 
for outputs and investments over which the department does have control.  In what 
follows, we shall ignore the administered items appropriations category, and focus 
upon the two appropriations elements which provide funding for purposes over which 
the department is considered to have control.  
 
The role played by parliamentary appropriations in financial control has been reduced 
somewhat under AOB.  This is because there has been a significant expansion in non-
appropriations sources of funding available to departments.  Departments are now 
able draw upon assets in their balance sheets as a source of funds which can be 
utilised without any need for parliamentary authorisation.  As explained below, this 
own-source funding is derived principally from "funded" depreciation, accumulated 
profits and asset sales receipts. 
 
The Payment for Outputs Appropriation 
 
The payment for outputs appropriation is an accrual rather than cash (or modified 
cash) appropriation.  In other words, it "funds" departmental expenses rather than 
departmental outlays.  The payment for outputs appropriation must therefore be 
applied to fund not merely cash expenses such as wage payments, but also non-cash 
expenses such as bills payable, increased liabilities for employee entitlements (such as 
long-service leave
8) and depreciation
9.  Most of these non-cash expenses involve 
future outlays.  Where this is the case, the department must set aside from its 
appropriation an amount sufficient to cover these future outlays.  Funds built up in the 
department's bank account to cover such liabilities are not surplus funds, and therefore 
cannot properly be regarded as potential own-source funding.  However, if a 
department's expenses in any year are less than the payment for outputs which it 
receives, the department makes a profit which represents unencumbered or surplus 
funds available for future own-source funding.  In addition to this, under most AOB 
systems "funded" depreciation generates a further reservoir of own-source 
departmental funds (more on this below). 
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Broadly speaking, the payment for outputs appropriation serves as an upper limit 
upon each department's expenses
10, so that the appropriated amount is a direct 
financial control aggregate.  This statement must be qualified.  In some instances, a 
department's budgeted expenses
11 may exceed its payment for outputs appropriation, 
with the consequent operating deficit being made up partly or wholly by drawing 
upon surplus own-source departmental funds.  The circumstances in which this might 
occur are discussed further below.  The key point to note at this stage is that 
departments can only incur expenses in excess of their payment for outputs if they are 
instructed or authorised to do so by the Treasurer.  Departments therefore do not 
enjoy decentralised control over the use of any surplus funds in their balance sheets.  
There is firm central control, of an administrative rather than parliamentary nature. 
 
The Equity Injection Appropriation and Capital Funding 
 
By contrast to the payment for outputs appropriation, the equity injection 
appropriation is not a direct financial control aggregate.  While it is true that the 
primary function of the equity injection appropriation is the provision of funds for 
capital purposes, own-source funds play a central role in funding capital expenditure 
under AOB.  Moreover, equity injections have, at least in theory, a function in 
addition to the funding of capital expenditure: they are a means of funding 
departmental operating deficits when departments do not have sufficient surplus own-
source funds for this purpose. 
 
There are two major types of own-source funding for capital expenditure.  The first of 
these is "funded" depreciation.  As noted above, the "price" which departments are 
paid for their products via the payment for outputs appropriation covers depreciation 
as well as other expenses.  Unlike these other expenses, depreciation does not involve 
an outlay either now or in future, so the depreciation component of the payment for 
outputs appropriation represents surplus funds which can therefore be uses to fund 
capital expenditure.  In most Australian jurisdictions, if a department's capital 
expenditure is less than its funded depreciation in a given year
12, the department 
retains the surplus depreciation funds and is able to draw upon them to fund future 
capital expenditure.  Underpinning this is a view that departments should, as a rule, be 
able to "maintain their capital base"
13 over time without requiring new equity 
injections from government, by using accumulated depreciation funds to fund asset 
replacement.  This doctrine of operating capital maintenance
14 explains the 
Commonwealth Department of Finance and Administration's assumption that "equity 
injections and loans are not generally expected to occur frequently"
15. 
 
Accumulated depreciation funds are, consequently, a potentially important form of 
own-source capital funding.  Crucially, however, departments require Treasury 
approval to draw upon accumulated depreciation funds.  Once again, firm central 
financial control has been maintained, but the control is administrative rather than 
parliamentary in nature. 
 
In addition to "funded" depreciation, asset sales receipts are also available for the 
own-source funding of capital expenditure.  Consistent with the doctrine of operating 
capital maintenance, if the department sells a physical asset it now retains the sale 
receipts.  This contrasts with pre-AOB arrangements under which the general 
principle was that asset sales receipts were paid over to Treasury, with any   5
arrangements for the partial or full retention of such receipts usually being negotiated 
on an ad hoc basis.  As with the other types of own-source funding, departmental use 
of these funds requires Treasury approval, as does any proposal to sell a major asset. 
 
The significance of funded depreciation and own-source capital funding is so great 
that a department's equity injection appropriation usually bears little relation to its 
capital expenditure.  It is even possible that a department might receive a negative 
equity injection, but nevertheless be undertaking capital expenditure.  In an attempt to 
make a rather complex position somewhat more transparent, the annual budget papers 
presented to parliaments now include a statement (known at the Commonwealth level 
as the Capital Budget Statement) which reports total capital expenditure and provides 
information about the sources of funds for that capital expenditure.  Notwithstanding 
this, it is fair to say that the AOB funding arrangement do obscure the nature of 
central financial control over capital expenditure. 
 
It is not uncommon to find amongst public servants a simple misconception about 
budgeting under accrual accounting a misconception encouraged by the opacity of 
the capital expenditure control mechanism under AOB.  The misconception is that the 
replacement of cash accounting with accrual accounting means that budgeting should 
be based on accrual rather than cash concepts, so that budgeting ought to dispense 
with control of outlays and focus exclusively upon control of expenses.  Such a view 
is obviously fundamentally mistaken.  Financial control cannot be effective if it relies 
exclusively either on outlays control or on expenses control.  As noted above, 
budgeting in pure cash accounting terms has the serious limitation that it fails to 
control expenses which involve future outlays.  Equally, however, to budget in pure 
accrual terms would be to fail to control outlays which involve future expenses (ie 
capital expenditure).  Just as outlays budgeting must be accompanied with other 
controls over expenses involving future outlays, so budgeting in an accrual accounting 
environment must continue to control capital expenditure aggregates. 
 
FINANCIAL CONTROL VERSUS DEPARTMENTAL MANAGERIAL 
AUTONOMY 
 
Within departments, the new financial control arrangements have led to some 
resentment.  Accrual output budgeting is firmly within the "new public management" 
tradition.  Its touchstones are devolution, de-control, and a focus upon accountability 
for results.  Indeed, accrual output budgeting arguably goes further than most internal 
market models in seeking to make departments operate like independent businesses.  
The intention is that departmental management should focus strongly upon the 
bottom-line operating result.  Yet under the new arrangements, departments have no 
discretionary power to use accumulated profits as they see fit.  Treasury approval is 
required.  Not only that, but if the department builds up significant accumulated 
profits, it may, as discussed below, be forced by Treasury to apply those funds to 
ordinary operating expenses which ought, by rights, to be met from the payment for 
outputs appropriation. 
 
Departments have, moreover, been told that they should become active managers of 
their fixed asset portfolio.  To reinforce this point, the Commonwealth and some of 
the States
16 have introduced capital charging regimes.  At the same time, however,   6
Treasuries insists upon the right to control departments in their use of depreciation 
funds and asset sales receipts. 
 
From the departmental perspective, there is consequently a huge gulf between 
devolution rhetoric and the reality of firm central financial control. 
 
It is tempting, but far too simplistic, to attribute the problem  to an unwillingness on 
the part of Treasuries to relinquish control.  The real problems is that there are 
fundamental limitations upon the application of the business template to tax-financed 
government departments.  In a market context, the corporation's owners 
(shareholders) are generally not also its customers, so they do not have to meet the 
corporation's operating expenses out of their own pockets.  Owners are, moreover, 
generally protected by limited liability, and are therefore able to distance themselves 
from the corporation's liabilities should become insolvent.  For these and other 
reasons, shareholders do not need to directly control the corporation's expenses, 
expenditure and liabilities.  The situation is, however, totally different in the budget 
sector of government.  If government is to keep taxes at acceptable rates, ensure fiscal 
sustainability (by preventing financial liabilities from reaching unsustainable levels), 
and pursue a fiscal policy consistent with its macroeconomic goals, it must assert firm 
central control over these fiscal aggregates. 
 
Financial control is exercised so as to achieve specific fiscal targets, and the nature of 
these targets is also important.  Under the former cash accounting and budgeting 
regime, the key fiscal aggregates upon which Australian governments focused were 
the cash budget balance
17 and its stock equivalent, net debt.  Following the adoption 
of accrual accounting, the Commonwealth has adopted a new headline fiscal policy 
indicator the so-called fiscal balance.  Whereas previously the Government's 
primary fiscal aim was structurally balanced cash budget, the objective now is "fiscal 
balance, on average, over the course of the business cycle"
18.  Fiscal balance is 
defined as the budget operating balance minus net public investment, and is the flow 
counterpart of net financial liabilities
19.  Fiscal balance is regarded by the 
Commonwealth Treasury as "the accrual counterpart of the underlying cash balance", 
and as a superior measure of government saving
20 
 
Discretionary control by departments over own-source funding would necessarily 
reduce the Government's capacity to control these fiscal aggregates.  When a 
department draws upon own-source funds to finance a cash outlay, the Government's 
cash budget balance deteriorates commensurately.  So, ceteris paribus, does net debt.  
Unless the cash outlays concerned are used to extinguish a financial liability (e.g. to 
pay long service leave), fiscal balance and net financial liabilities also deteriorate. 
 
Against this, it might be argued that to give departments unfettered control over the 
use of their "own" funds would hardly be to permit an unrestrained fiscal free-for-all.  
Departmental freedom in the use of accumulated profits, for example, could be 
viewed as something like permitting departments to carry over unexpended 
appropriation amounts from one year to the next.  Moreover, the unconstrained use of 
accumulated depreciation funds would give departments only a degree of capital 
expenditure freedom namely, the freedom to undertake sufficient capital 
expenditure to compensate for past asset depreciation and thus maintain their   7
operating capacity.  Any expansion of the departmental capital stock beyond this 
would require an additional equity injection from government. 
 
It is possible, therefore, to argue for the removal of central controls over the use of 
departmental own-source funds on the grounds that it is merely an extension of the 
wholesome idea of multi-year budgeting.  Unfortunately, however, to argue along 
these lines would be to ignore two fundamental constraints.  The first is that 
governments do, for a variety of good reasons, view their capacity to set and achieve 
annual fiscal targets as of fundamental importance.  As long as this is the case, the 
scope for appropriations carryovers must remain severely limited.  The second point 
is that the unconstrained use of accumulated depreciation funds only make sense to 
the extent that it is desirable that each department over time at least maintains its 
capital stock.  If, however, government wishes to retain a capacity to change the 
functional and departmental allocation of the budget sector capital stock over time, it 
cannot afford to relinquish central control over departmental use of accumulated 
depreciation. 
 
ACCRUAL BUDGETING VERSUS ACCRUAL OUTPUT BUDGETING 
 
Under accrual output budgeting, neither the appropriations framework nor the central 
financial control mechanism more generally could be said to be simple and 
transparent.  The sourcing of capital expenditure from both the equity injection 
appropriation and the payment for outputs appropriation (via "funded" depreciation) 
appears to be a source of considerable confusion even amongst public servants.  The 
nature and role of non-appropriations funding sources is also widely misunderstood
21. 
 
It cannot be said that these complex appropriations and funding arrangements are a 
necessary consequence of the adoption of accrual accounting.  Financial control and 
financial reporting are two separate processes with different objectives.  For financial 
reporting purposes, depreciation certainly needs to be recognised together with other 
expenses, because only by doing so can the full cost of government service provision 
be determined.  This does not, however, mean that it is necessary or appropriate to 
include depreciation together with other expenses when setting limits upon 
departmental resource usage.  Depreciation is not a controllable expense, and unlike 
other expenses it does not require cash outlays in the present or future.  Financial 
control would be achieved with greater simplicity, and no loss of efficacy, if 
Parliament appropriated an expenses budget which covered only expenses which 
involve current or future cash outlays on the part of the department, without any 
pretence of "funding" depreciation.  This would amount to the use for budgeting   
purposes of what Professor Chan calls the "semi-strong modified accrual concept"
22, 
with the use of full accrual accounting for financial reporting purposes. 
 
Excluding depreciation from an expenses appropriation would be consistent with a 
return to the former capital expenditure appropriation arrangement, in which all 
sources of capital funding were brought within the umbrella of the relevant 
appropriation.  Once again, the difference between financial reporting and financial 
control is crucial.  As noted above, central control over capital expenditure aggregates 
is essential irrespective of whether accrual or cash accounting is employed for 
financial reporting purposes, and a comprehensive capital expenditure appropriation 
category would help make this control more transparent.   8
The inclusion of depreciation in the expenses appropriation under AOB (and its 
consequent exclusion from the equity injection appropriation) has, of course, nothing 
to do with the financial control function of budgeting.  Rather, it derives from the 
commercialisation objective of AOB, and more specifically from the notion that the 
payment for outputs appropriation should represent the revenue earned by the 
department by delivering products to its customer.  Ordinary businesses must strive to 
cover all their operating expenses, including depreciation, from the revenue they earn 
by selling their products.  So if departments are to be made to operate like businesses, 
then they should be able to cover all their costs from their revenue at least if they 
are operating efficiently and delivering the products which their customer has ordered. 
 
AOB enthusiasts might therefore take the view that the increased complexity of AOB 
financial control arrangements, while unfortunate if considered in isolation, is an 
acceptable price to pay for the performance-enhancing effects which they see as 
arising from the thoroughgoing application of the market model to public budgeting.  
This might suggest that one needs to evaluate AOB as a performance budgeting 
system before passing any final judgement upon it from a financial control 
perspective.  Such an evaluation is, regrettably, beyond the scope of the present paper, 
although evaluations of the New Zealand "contract budgeting" system have raised 
major conceptual and problems which are directly applicable to Australian AOB and 
which raise doubts about its practicability and efficacy
23. 
 
However, even if one were to accept the credentials of AOB as a performance 
budgeting system, it is still possible to question the wisdom of the AOB 
appropriations and financial control framework.  The most problematic features of 
AOB in this respect arise from the dual function of the payment for outputs 
appropriation in the AOB framework as both "revenue earned" and as a ceiling on 
departmental expenses. 
 
First, a little context.  If government departments are to be placed on a business 
footing and if, more specifically, departmental financial results are to be transformed 
into a key departmental performance measure, it is essential that there be a clear 
distinction between costs and revenue earned.  In a (competitive) market context, the 
revenue earned by a business from sales to customers bears no necessary relationship 
to its total costs of production.  Indeed, the whole point about market performance 
incentives lies in the difference between the revenue and costs.  If your costs exceed 
your revenue whether because your unit costs exceed the prevailing market price or 
because of poor delivery performance you make a loss.  If your revenue exceeds 
your costs, you make a profit. If market incentives are to be made to operate in the 
non-profit public sector, it is therefore essential that the payment for outputs reflect ‘a 
fair market price separate from the cost of outputs'
24.  Consistent with this, the stated 
aim in all Australian AOB jurisdictions is that, over time, the price paid by 
government for departmental outputs should be based upon the "efficient" costs of 
production (as determined by benchmarking, market testing and similar processes) 
rather than upon actual departmental costs
25. 
 
The dual function of the payment for outputs appropriation as revenue earned and as a 
financial control variable is deeply problematic from this perspective.  If the 
distinction between revenue and costs (expenses) were to be put into effect, it would   9
have to be possible for a department to make a loss (earn revenue which was less than 
its expenses) if either 
 
•  Its actual costs of production were known (ex ante) to exceed the "efficient" cost 
of production, and it was impracticable or undesirable to immediately contract out 
production of the outputs concerned, 
•  The department used all its appropriated funding but failed to deliver to 
government the full quantity (or quality) of output which it had "agreed" in the 
budget process that it would produce (so that unit costs exceeded price ex post). 
 
If, however, the payment for outputs appropriation purports to represent both revenue 
and the expenses ceiling, departments are necessarily barred from incurring expenses 
in excess of "revenue".  It is then impossible for a department to make a loss because 
of poor performance. Under these circumstances, the appropriation cannot function as 
a measure of revenue earned and the departmental profit/loss figure cannot even in 
principle constitute a meaningful measure of departmental performance in delivering 
services to the community. 
 
If one accepts that the parliamentary output expenses appropriation cannot 
simultaneously serve the revenue payable and expenses control function, an obvious 
solution is to confine the role of the expenses appropriation to that of financial 
control.  Revenue payable would then be determined separately, generally at a level 
not in excess of, but potentially below, budgeted or actual expenses.  Under these 
circumstances, it would be quite possible to combine AOB with a system in which the 
expenses appropriation did not purport to include depreciation, and the capital 
appropriation included all sources of capital funding. 
 
In the state of Victoria, the distinction between revenue earned and costs incurred has 
in fact been partly recognised through a system of 'payment for results'.  Nothing like 
it exists elsewhere in Australia (or in New Zealand for that matter).  In Victoria, the 
parliamentary appropriations represents an authorisation to incur expenses, but is not 
regarded as revenue per se.  Departments use these appropriated funds to produce 
outputs, but are then required to "invoice" Treasury on a quarterly basis for "payment" 
in respect to the outputs delivered.  Only the output payments authorised by Treasury 
can be recognised as revenue in the department's annual accounts.  If the department 
were to deliver less output than it was committed to produce, it might in principle earn 
revenue which was less than its expenses
26.  The result, theoretically, would be an 
operating loss which was indicative of departmental under-performance. 
 
It is not possible to analyse the Victorian system in this paper, other than to note that 
theory and practice are two distinct things.  There has to date been no instance of 
Victorian departments being "paid" revenue less than its expenses as a consequence of 
adjudged under-performance.  Political considerations are part of the explanation: 
individual ministers have successfully fought off certain attempts by Treasury to 
inflict such paper losses upon departments which it perceived as under-performing.  
Beyond this, as brave as it is, the Victorian system does not provide a solution to a 
broader set of problems which impinge upon the practicability and efficacy of the 
whole AOB scheme.  Once again, however, these broader issues lie beyond the scope 
of the present paper.   10
It was noted earlier that, although the payment for outputs appropriation generally 
serves as an expenses ceiling, there have in fact been examples of departments which 
have been appropriations which are less than their anticipated expenses, implying a 
budgeted operating deficit.  Perhaps, it might be thought, this reflects the 
implementation of the principle of payment based on efficient cost rather than actual 
cost?  A review of a large number of departmental budgets suggests, however, that 
this is not the case.  Some budgeted operating deficits operating deficits arise from 
purely "technical" accounting considerations
27.  Where this is not the case, budgeted 
operating deficits have been a means by which certain State Treasuries have forced 
departments to disgorge what they regard as excessive levels of "surplus" funds in 
their bank accounts.  What has happened has been that the payment for outputs is 
deliberately set by Treasury at a level below departmental expenses, and the 
department is then required to fund the difference from its own resource.  Such an 
approach certainly has nothing to do with the competitive market model.  Indeed, it 
illustrates further the tension between financial control and performance budgeting 
objectives, because it is quite conceivable that a profitable department may find itself 




The system of central financial control has changed significantly in Australia with the 
adoption of accrual output budgeting.  The nature of parliamentary appropriations has 
changed considerably, and own-source departmental funds which do not require 
parliamentary authorisation now play a quite important role.  The reduction in central 
financial control via the appropriations process has not, however, led to an overall 
lessening of the degree of central financial control over departments.  Rather, the 
reduced role for parliament has led to a commensurate increase in reliance upon 
administrative controls. 
 
The new appropriations and funding arrangements are complex and are confusing 
even to many public officials.  They reduce fiscal transparency and might even be 
seen as reducing democratic accountability. 
 
These arrangements derive from the attempt to transform budgeting into a system 
which simulates market purchaser/provider and owner/enterprise relationships, so as 
to promote better output delivery performance from government departments.  A key 
question therefore is whether the performance gains from accrual output budgeting 
are likely over time to outweigh the losses of transparency and accountability.   
However, even within an AOB framework, there is a case to be made for major 
simplification of these financial control mechanisms.  
 
AOB has generated significant tension between government departments and 
treasuries.  Departments are expected to operate like businesses, and to manage their 
funds accordingly.  At the same time, however, they are supervised and controlled 
when they seek to make use of their "own" funds.  The problem here is that there are 
fundamental differences between government and the private sector, which tend to be 
overlooked or downplayed by exponents of the "new public management".  More 
specifically, governments can only successfully achieve control crucial fiscal 
aggregates such as the budget balance and net debt or net liabilities if they exert   11
strong control over departmental expenses/outlays irrespective of whether they are 
financed from appropriations or "own-source" funds.  
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